着眼于盈余管理视角,以我国的信用评级机构、公司债券发行公司、金融监管部门为研究对象,建立精炼贝叶斯均衡博弈及二阶段展期模型,研究发行公司债券的上市公司、信用评级机构与金融监管部门之间的利益博弈路径.研究发现:在获取发行资格、节约债券融资成本的动机驱使下,发债公司存在通过盈余管理进行评级意见购买的动机,盈余管理水平越高,信用评级越高;声誉机制的跨期收益与惩罚特征、发债公司与评级机构的短期行为、金融监管缺位等因素增强了评级机构的合谋倾向,从而导致评级普遍虚高,查处与惩罚力度的增强则可有效遏制盈余管理程度和评级虚高现象,这对完善我国现阶段金融领域征信体系具有重要的参考价值.
Abstract
In the perspective of earnings management, this paper researches on credit rating agencies, corporate bond issuing companies and supervision departments. The Refined Bayesian Equilibrium Game and second phase extension models are established to delve into the interests game path of the aforementioned three parties. The conclusions are as follows: firstly, in order to obtain issue qualification and save the cost of bond financing, the issuing company has the motive to purchase rating opinion through the earnings management;secondly, rating agencies collusion may attribate to the lack of supervision, the short-term behavior of the issmers and rating agencies, and the inter-temporal income and punishment characteristics of the reputation mechanism, which can be effectively curbed by enhancing investigation and punishment.These findings have an important reference value to improving our social credit system.
关键词
信用评级 /
盈余管理 /
精炼贝叶斯均衡博弈
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Key words
credit rating /
earnings management /
Refined Bayesian Equilibrium Game
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参考文献
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672202);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2016A030313304);广东省教育厅资助项目(2016WQNCX123);2017年度广州市哲学社会科学“十三五”规划课题资助项目(2017GZQN15)
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