并购重组中的业绩承诺与中小投资者保护——以盈方微公司为例

张婧昕, 陈 洁

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广州大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2017, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (8) : 43-50.
论文

并购重组中的业绩承诺与中小投资者保护——以盈方微公司为例

  • 张婧昕1, 陈 洁2
作者信息 +

Performance Commitment and Protection of Medium and Small Investors in Merger and Acquisition: A Case of Infotmic Co.,Ltd.

  • ZHANG Jingxin1, CHEN Jie2
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摘要

业绩承诺补偿制度有利于在上市公司的并购重组过程中降低信息不对称,促进对标的资产的公平定价,在一定程度上保护了中小投资者的利益。业绩承诺未达标,就由承诺主体进行补偿,使股价具有安全保障,但是,在业绩不达标的情况下即使进行补偿,中小投资者的利益就没有受到损害了吗?基于对上述问题的思考,文章以盈方微电子股份有限公司为例,采取案例研究的方法,研究资产重组中收购方的业绩承诺行为及其对中小投资者利益的影响,结果发现,现金补偿未能改善盈方微公司的盈利能力。收到业绩承诺补偿金前后20个交易日,累计超额收益率均为负。在公司经营业绩较差的情况下,现金补偿类的业绩承诺对中小投资者利益的保护作用有限。

Abstract

Performance commitment compensation system is of the benefit of information asymmetry reduction in the progress of listed companies’ merger and acquisition, promoting fair pricing of underlying assets and protecting the benefit of the medium and small investors to some extent. If the performance commitment is not achieved, the duty undertaker will make a compensation in order to safeguard share price. Though a compensation is made under that circumstance, wouldn’t the benefit of the medium and small investors be really damaged? Based on this question, with the case study method, this paper tries to analyze Infotmic Co.,Ltd., studying the performance commitment of commitment bodies and its effect on the benefit of medium and small investors. The results show that cash compensation can’t promote the profitability of Infotmic Co.,Ltd. In 20 trading days round receiving cash compensation, the CAR is negative. Under the circumstance of companies’ underperformance, such performance commitments as cash compensation play a limited role in protecting the medium and small investors’ benefit.

关键词

并购重组 / 现金补偿 / 业绩承诺 / 中小投资者保护

Key words

merger and acquisition / cash compensation / performance commitment / protection of the medium and small investors

引用本文

导出引用
张婧昕, 陈 洁. 并购重组中的业绩承诺与中小投资者保护——以盈方微公司为例. 广州大学学报(社会科学版). 2017, 16(8): 43-50
ZHANG Jingxin, CHEN Jie. Performance Commitment and Protection of Medium and Small Investors in Merger and Acquisition: A Case of Infotmic Co.,Ltd.. Journal of Guangzhou University (Social Science Edition). 2017, 16(8): 43-50

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